Naval History Blog

The last naval action of the War of 1812, a contest between U.S. sloop of war Peacock and the British East India Company brig Nautilus, took place on 30 June 1815, in the Sunda Strait off Java——four months after the declaration of peace.

On 1 December 1814, Secretary of the Navy William Jones had directed Commodore Stephen Decatur to lead a four-ship squadron comprising the frigate President, sloops of war Peacock and Hornet, and the store ship Tom Bowline on a commerce raiding cruise in the East Indies. By the end of April 1815, only Peacock remained to fulfill the mission. Still unaware that the war had ended, Peacock captured three English merchantmen during June off Java.

On the morning of 30 June, the Americans encountered the East India Company brig Nautilus in Java’s Anjier Roads. Peacock’s captain, Lewis Warrington, disregarding Nautilus’s protestations about the peace treaty, ordered his crew to open fire. Nautilus struck after a scant, fifteen-minute battle, having sustained considerable damage and casualties. The next day Java officials sent proof of the peace; Peacock sailed for America, the war finally over for its crew.

The diplomatic repercussions of Warrington’s post-War of 1812 cruise reverberated throughout the Navy and State Departments and in Congress for the next thirteen years. By 1828 the American government had satisfied all the monetary claims initiated on behalf of the three merchant vessels captured by Peacock. The British silence about any indemnification for the alleged “wanton violence” against Nautilus may have been due to Great Britain’s more conciliatory policy toward America in the postwar era.

This and many other videos from our archives can be viewed at the Naval History & Heritage Command’s YouTube Channel.

From Seal of Honor:

“On 28 June 2005, Navy Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy led a four man special reconnaissance SEAL team consisting of Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class Danny Dietz, Sonar Technician 2nd Class Matthew Axelson and Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Marcus Luttrell to locate Ahmad Shah, a notorious Taliban leader in the remote Hindu Kush Mountains of eastern Afghanistan.

After an initial infiltration to begin Operation Red Wings, local goat herders stumbled upon the team’s hiding place. Unable to verify any hostile intent from the herders, Murphy ordered them released. Shortly after the herders left, the team was surrounded by a large force of Taliban fighters.

After about an hour and engaged in the most fierce fire fight since World War II and the most fierce in SEAL team history, LT Michael Patrick Murphy, in a last ditch effort to save his men knowingly stepped into the line of fire to obtain reception for his cell phone in order to call for reinforcements. One of the two rescue helicopters sent in response to Murphy’s call was shot down killing 8 navy SEALS and 8 Army “Night Stalkers”.

Marcus Luttrell was the lone survivor and gave a detailed briefing to military leaders that resulted in LT Michael Patrick Murphy being awarded this nation’s highest military award, the Medal of Honor.”

On 24 June 2010, Lt. Michael Murphy’s father, Dan Murphy, appeared at the National Museum of the U.S. Navy in Washington, DC with SEAL of Honor author, Gary Williams.  Here’s an excerpt of Dan Murphy’s talk from our YouTube channel:

Carol Comegno writes in yesterday’s Courier Post, “The Battleship New Jersey rests tranquilly on the Delaware River today as a naval museum on the Camden Waterfront silhouetted by the Philadelphia skyline across the river. Sixty years ago today when the Korean War started in 1950, it was also resting, as an inactive ship in the New Jersey Naval Yard at Bayonne after stellar service in World War II. But not for long. War called and the ship was recommissioned at Bayonne on Nov. 21, 1950, and served two tours of duty off the coast of Korea from 1951 to 1953, shelling coastal areas with its nine booming 16-inch guns — the largest ever manufactured for the Navy.”

Full article here.

For a short history of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) in the Korean War, click here.  For aditional photos of the “Big Jay” click here.

USS New Jersey (BB-62) fires a nine 16-inch gun salvo during bombardment operations against enemy targets in Korea, adjacent to the 38th parallel. Photo is dated 10 November 1951.

Fuller, Howard J. Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

     Civil War naval histories are itself a niche market in the spectrum of scholarship written about the five year conflict. As we draw near the beginning of the sesquicentennial celebration of the American Civil War, a cursory examination of previous scholarship reveals an obsession with fleet operations and technology. It is no surprise then that monographs written about famous naval battles and leaders of the Union and Confederacy will continue to increase in their appeal. Yet what is perceived as new scholarship about the dawn of modern naval warfare more often a metaphorical “slight of hand” to previous arguments. University of Wolverhampton Senior War Studies lecturer Howard J. Fuller’s recent work, Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power, breaks this chain, offering readers an interesting and insightful interpretation to the Civil War’s most overlooked aspect.

     Amidst the greatest test in our nation’s history, massive technological, political, and social change occurred on all fronts in the United States. Between these lines of conventional wisdom, a far more pressing issue occurred between policymakers in Washington and London over the threat of war. Fuller discusses these issues thoroughly from a naval perspective, examining the diplomatic and strategic goals of Britain’s budding ironclad navy in direct response to American sea power.

     Clad in Iron is not a narrative of conflict so often found in Civil War historiography. The focus instead resides in how conflict was ultimately avoided with Britain. Even in the wake of an international crisis like the TrentAffair, an unnecessary war between Britain would be an equally unprepared one between fleets on either side of the Atlantic. That possibility of war from the British perspective, Fuller suggests, became a necessary challenge to the growth of a large maritime force in the pre-Dreadnaught era. Victory in 1865 became a dual one over the Confederacy militarily and the British diplomatically.

     Clad in Iron begins with an informative discussion on why Anglo-French naval policy before the Civil War inexorably altered the course of change in America. Although the British ironclad program “began purely as a response to the establishment of the French ironclad fleet of Napoleon III,” focus shifted after the introduction of the American program in the first two years of the war. It is interesting to note how Fuller details the naval rivalry between France’s La Gloire and Britain’s Warrior occurred well before the Monitor and Virginiaever engaged in combat. Naval architects like Captain Cowper Coles and Dupuy de Lôme are given due credit to the evolution and revolution of ironclad navies normally reserved only for John Ericsson.

     Several chapters are devoted to the “war within,” as the debate and hesitancy of Union political and military officials mirrored that of Great Britain. The need to satisfy Washington of a sufficient coastal force with the possibility of foreign intervention became the ammunition to the argument for the ambitious program initiated by Ericsson. Fuller posits the necessity of such ambition in correlation to the “vested interest” of Britain in the failure of the southern blockade. He notes how Union War Secretary William H. Seward feared British reception during the beginning years of the war under the backdrop of events like the 1861 Trent Affair and Battle of Hampton Roads. The best chapter in the book, “Two Ironclad Adversaries,” sums up a large portion of this central theme. Fuller feels that necessity of an effective ironclad navy was built in direct response to both the Confederacy and Great Britain, one being “actual” and the other “potential.”

     With regards to Hampton Roads, it is one of Fuller’s main points to mention how Monitors were used not for their capacity to become the scourge of Confederate fleets and coastal force, but as a technological “check” to competing programs in Britain as well. The Trent Affair is used “in direct contrast to the battle of Hampton Roads,” because “the Anglo-American naval balance of power was completely upset” in a mere three month window. Fuller also suggests the greatest loser in mid-19th century naval innovations was the French. Through clash of armor, Union and Confederate ironclad warships confirmed British suspicions while damning the French’s narrow disregard for such vessels. It would be multi-turreted ships that survived and evolved after the war, not broadside and sail ironclads as the French suspected. The Monitor’s innovation brought forth the emergence of the first turreted capital ship in the Royal Navy, HMS Devastation. Fuller makes good use of the ironclad-era to detail how events occurring in one conflict continually shaped others.

     One of Clad in Iron’s hallmarks is the method Fuller uses to formulate his arguments. Interpretations of events are taken from letters and reports written by sailors, foreign ministers, and politicians. The analysis is evenhanded and methodical, often offering comparisons in minute details like tonnage and budgetary restrictions. Indeed, Fuller intends to leave no stone unturned. More interesting is the analysis of print media in the United States and Great Britain. Fuller makes the reader believe that the threat of foreign intervention was at a state of near paranoia in both countries, with its only solution through the use of iron-wielded steam power, not amassed troops and musket fire.

     Flaws to Clad in Iron are merely superficial. More attention might be paid in future scholarship on the relationship Britain and Confederate blockade running, which is mentioned only in passing. Fuller also gives very little credit to the Union’s broadside ironclad USS New Ironsides, which many consider to be a comparable vessel to the Monitor.

     Civil War historians will champion the level of care taken by Fuller to accurately document and chronicle the challenge British naval experts and politicians had on the American ironclad program. His work is highly recommended for scholars and layman alike who might find interest in the unspoken foe across the Atlantic chessboard. Clad in Iron is not the definitive Civil War naval history written on the heels of the sesquicentennial, but it is a fantastic and fresh start.

Lance M. Bacon of the Navy Times writes, “The fast-attack submarine Philadelphia will be decommissioned Friday, the 33rd anniversary of its commissioning.  The third in the Los Angeles class and the sixth ship to bear the name, Philadelphia finished strong. The sub completed its 16th and final deployment Feb. 3 when it returned to Naval Submarine Base New London, Conn.”

For histories of the previous ships named Philadelphia click here, here, here, here, and here.

USS Philadelphia (SSN-690) at sea circa 1980s. From the collection of Jim Dolbow.

60 years ago today, North Korea invaded South Korea.  Our very own Dr. Edward J. Marolda, author of The United States Navy and the Korean War, discusses on Naval History Blog the U.S. Navy’s role in the Korean War:

What inspired you to first produce booklets commemorating the Korean War and then later compiling them into The U.S. Navy and the Korean War?

One of my primary objectives during my time at Naval Historical Center (now Naval History and Heritage Command) was to stimulate interest in the vital history of the U.S. Navy in the Cold War era. As head of the Contemporary History Branch and then as Senior Historian, I sought to generate works on this period. We began and completed multi-page books on the USN in the Cold War but I anticipated a need for shorter studies during the 50th anniversary of the Korean War from 2000-2003. With the funding assistance of the DOD Korean War Commemoration Committee and the Naval Historical Foundation, we enlisted authors for the booklets and when produced distributed them to numerous commemoration groups and naval activities nationwide. To reach another key audience (the members of the Naval Institute) I then partnered with the USNI and the NHF to produce the book, which I am pleased to say has generated lots of positive comment.

Who were your contributors on this important project?

In addition to the organizations mentioned above, the most important contributors to the project were the individual authors, some of the finest naval historians around, including the late Tom Buell, Joe Alexander, Dick Knott, Tom Cutler, Curtis Utz, Bernie Nalty, and Malcomb (Kip) Muir.

What was the Navy’s role in the Korean War?

Withouth the USN, the UN coalition would not have been able to fight in Korea. Within a few weeks of the North Korean invasion, US, UK, and ROK naval units were driving North Korean naval forces from the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan; sea control was never in question after that. The Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service rushed troop reinforcements into South Korea that prevented loss of the peninsula. At the same time carrier-based Navy, Marine, and British aviation forces bombed the North Korean capital at Pyongyang, bombarded the enemy’s supply lines leading to Pusan, and provided UN ground forces with close air support. In addition to the masterful amphibious assault at Inchon which changed the power equation in mid-1950, the threat of other amphibious operations throughout the war compelled Mao and Kim to keep powerful forces away from the front line at the 38th parallel. Naval air both shore and carrier-based was critical to the 1st Marine Division’s successful fight to the sea from Chosin Reservoir (in the process badly beating up several PLA armies). Moreover, the fleet successfully withdrew 91,000 troops and their equipment (and 100,000 refugees) from Hungnam to South Korea and they were soon in the fight again. Naval bombardmente from BBs and other combatants denied the enemy free use of his own coastlines.

How did maritime power keep the first “limited war” of the Cold War era confined to Korea?

With the “neutralization” of the Straits of Taiwan by the Seventh Fleet at the outset of the war and carrier task force sweeps along the China coast throughout the war, Washington made it clear to Bejing that any attempt to widen the war beyong Korea would put China’s coastal cities and industries at great risk. The Soviets were equally concerned about the vulnerability of their remote Far Eastern holdings.

What projects are you working on now?

A few years ago (while I worked at the NHC) in anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the start of the Vietnam War (one could pick several dates for that, but I chose 1965) in 2015, I inaugurated a new commemorative booklet series. With invaluable assistance of the Naval Historical Foundation, I enlisted distinguished authors to write individual booklets on the following topics: coastal operations, riverine operations, Operation Rolling Thunder, Operation Linebacker, POWs, naval leaders of the Vietnam War, sealift and logistic support, intelligence, Seabees and naval construction, and special operations. As a consultant to the NHHC, I am continuing work on the project as coeditor with Sandra Doyle, the NHHC’s Publications Editor. We hope to have 14 booklets completed by 2015.

Is there anything else you would like to add?

I continue to believe there is much more we all can do to preserve and interpret the Navy’s vital contribution to the nation’s success in the the Cold War. In addition to the Vietnam booklet series, the NHHC and the NHF are embarked on a major project, completing a Cold War Gallery to the National Museum of the United States Navy at the Washington Navy Yard.

Originally posted here.