The great success of the Inchon Invasion in September 1950 led General Douglas A. MacArthur to order a second amphibious assault, targeting Wonsan on North Korea‚Äôs east coast. After landing there, Tenth Corps could advance inland, link up with the Eighth Army moving north from Seoul, and hasten the destruction of the North Korean army. Wonsan would also provide UN forces with another logistics support seaport, one closer to the battlefronts than Pusan and with greater handling capacity than tide-encumbered Inchon.
Since the enemy army‚Äôs cohesiveness collapsed much more rapidly than expected, by the Wonsan operation‚Äôs planned execution date of 20 October 1950, its immediate strategic goals had been overtaken by events. However, the forces landed there proved valuable in the push up North Korea‚Äôs east side, and the captured port did fulfill its intended mission.
Wonsan‚Äôs greatest value, though, was unintended: it gave the U.S. Navy a valuable reminder of the fruits of neglecting mine countermeasures, that unglamorous side of maritime power that, when it is needed, is needed very badly. Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, remarked, ‚Äúwhen you can‚Äôt go where you want to, when you want to, you haven‚Äôt got command of the sea.‚ÄĚ This experience provoked one of the greatest minesweeper building programs in the Navy‚Äôs history, one that produced hundreds of ships to serve not only under the U.S. flag, but under those of many allied nations.