Naval History Blog

This article was published in the May 1964 issue of Proceedings as “Searching for the Thresher” by Frank A. Andrews, Captain, U.S. Navy.

The Thresher search was very much an ad hoc operation. On 10 April 1963, the day of the Thresher‘s loss, there was no real search organization, no search technique, nor specific operating procedures for locating an object lying on the ocean bottom at 8,400 feet. In the first frantic hours after the Thresher‘s loss, a full scale search effort consisting of 13 ships was laid on with the aim of scouring the ocean for possible life or floating signs from the Thresher. Within 20 search hours, all hope for survivors had passed, and the entire Thresher project began to change character from that of a standard Navy search and rescue opera­tion to that of an oceanographic expedition. This special expedition soon consisted of three ad hoc elements, which, as later events were to show, combined in a most successful and harmonious manner in support of searching out the Thresher‘s hull.

Diagram of the search for the lost USS Thresher.

The first was the sea-going element. This group, called Task Group 89.7, was ever changing in number and types of ships. At its maximum at-sea size, it consisted of 13 men-­of-war (including two submarines) and many search aircraft rushed to the disaster scene on the day of the Thresher‘s loss. At its minimum, TG 89.7 consisted of one lone oceanographic vessel—the Conrad on one occasion, the Atlan­tis II on another—left toiling away on station while the task group commander and staff (usually one officer and one chief radioman) were ashore conferring with others in prepa­ration for the commencement of a new phase of the search. In all, 28 naval warships and five oceanographic research, or service, vessels participated in Task Group 89.7 from 10 April 1963 until 6 September 1963, when a substantial portion of the Thresher wreckage was located by the bathyscaph Trieste.

The second of the expedition’s three ele­ments was an 11-man shore-based brain trust called the CNO Technical Advisory Group. Its mission was to provide technical guidance to the at-sea search effort. In actual fact, this Advisory Group did much more than propose ideas. Its members also procured ships and hardware, and, in the case of certain indi­vidual members, came to sea with the ships to assist in searching. The Chairman of the Advisory Group was Dr. Arthur Maxwell, Senior Oceanographer in the Office of Naval Research. Captain Charles Bishop, U.S. Navy, the senior sub­marine officer in the Office of the Deputy CNO for Research and Development (OP-07), served as Co-Chairman and CNO liaison officer. The membership of the committee consisted of senior representatives from the Naval Oceanographic Office, the Lamont Geological Observatory, the Bureau of Ships, the Hudson Laboratories, the Naval Re­search Laboratory, the Oceanographic De­partment of the University of Rhode Island, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the Naval Reactors Branch of the AEC, and the Oceanographic Group at the University of Miami.

The third special element was the Thresher Analysis Group which set up operations in the Walsh House at the Woods Hole Oceano­graphic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachu­setts. This Group soon became known as TAG WHOI, pronounced Tag Hooey. Its leader was Mr. Arthur Molloy of the Navy’s Oceanographic Office in Suitland, Maryland. TAG WHOI had a varying complement but, over-all, 15 civilians or naval officers spent three or more weeks with this element. These men represented the Submarine Development Group at New London, NAVOCEANO, NEL, NRL and WHOI; they were all obtained from their many parent organizations simply by asking. Read the rest of this entry »

This article was originally published in the April 1959 issue of Proceedings as “Peary at the North Pole” by Hugh C. Mitchell

On September 5, 1909, the steamer Roosevelt reached Indian Harbor in Labrador, and Robert E. Peary, a com­mander in the Civil Engineer Corps of the U. S. Navy, wired the secretary of the Peary Arctic Club in New York City a cipher message which, being decoded, read, “Pole reached. Roosevelt Safe.” And at the same time a message went to Mrs. Peary: “Have made good. I have the pole. Am well. Love.”

These messages announced the success of Peary, after many years of tireless effort, in reaching the north geographic pole of the earth, the goal of many intrepid explorers in years gone by, possibly the greatest and most sought for geographic prize of all time, and also the most difficult of attainment.

Peary had striven for this prize over many years of heroic effort—years of trials and dis­appointments, but not of failures, for his motto was, “I will find a way or make one!” Peary never quit trying! During all these years of effort he was learning more about the conditions affecting the problem he was seek­ing to solve-the way to the Pole. He was learning more about the Eskimos, about their capabilities in handling dogs and sleds in all kinds of ice and weather conditions, and, even more important, he was winning their affec­tion and loyalty by his own acts of friendliness and humanitarianism. He was learning more about the ways of the weather, overhead and underfoot, for upon such knowledge would depend important decisions which might mean success or failure. Many years later, a naturalist, considering another matter, wrote, “It is useless to blame Nature, it is better to work with her. She will not change.” And Peary, knowing nature to be a capricious mistress, was matching her whims with ex­perience, surer methods of ice travel and im­proved equipment.

All these years Peary was both finding and making a way to the Pole, so that when men and dogs were in readiness, when wind and ice conditions were favorable, and equipment was complete and in the best possible condi­tion, he made the great effort and on April 6, 1909, after five weeks of sledging over the polar ice, he took an observation on the sun which gave him a position line of 89° 57′ north latitude. Supported by similar observations made by other members of his party on the way up, by direction of march obtained from the sun when it was on his meridian of travel, and by estimated distances of travel, this posi­tion line assured Peary that he was quite close to the North Pole, that imaginary point on the earth at latitude 90° north where all meridians meet and all directions are south.

Read the rest of this entry »

The USS Thresher (SSN-593) is shown before her loss, underway in the North Atlantic in this painting by Carl Evers.

by E. W. Grenfell, Vice Admiral, USN & published in the March, 1964 issue of Proceedings magazine:

On 10 April 1963, the U. S. Navy suffered the loss of the nuclear submarine Thresher, the nation’s third peacetime sub­marine loss since World War II, and by far the United States’ greatest single submarine disaster in terms of loss of life. The public, both in the United States and abroad, reacted with compassion for the fam­ilies of these men who gave their lives in the cause of freedom and pioneering. Seamen the world over have expressed reverent respect for these gallant men who paid part of the eternal tribute demanded by the sea from those who dare to venture on, or beneath, the trackless waters. Read the rest of this entry »

 

A Japanese Judy burning after being shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the USS Wasp (CV-18) off the Ryukyus on 18 March 1945.

This article was published in the May 1954 issue of Proceedings magazine as “Kamikazes and the Okinawa Campaign” by Rear Admiral Toshiyuki Yokoi, former Imperial Japanese Navy, with the assistance of Roger Pineau.

Japan’s special air attack units (Kamikaze) were initially organized under very particular circumstances and with limited operational objectives in the Philippines late in 1944. In the first stage Admiral Ohnishi certainly did not conceive of either allocating more than 24 planes for such suicide attacks or continuing this type of operation indefinitely, because there are serious basic defects in this type of attack. First, the expenditure of life and materiel is great. It takes several years to train one good pilot, yet in Kamikaze operations, he, as well as his plane, will be expended in a single sortie. This runs counter to the most important problem of an operation staff, which is to attain objectives with the least possible expenditure of life and materiel. Second, the striking velocity of a plane is not great enough to penetrate the decks of fleet carriers or battleships and cause critical damage below. A suicide attack on a carrier deck will not strike a vital blow unless the deck is full of planes. Third, operational command of Kamikaze planes is difficult because results cannot be evaluated with any accuracy. When his subordinates’ lives are sacrificed, a commander will naturally tend to overestimate the results achieved. When such overestimates are compounded, a totally erroneous picture will be presented to the high com­mand, whose judgment and decisions in turn will be falsely influenced.

These factors provide substantial reason why wise commanders were opposed to suicide air attacks, and yet the early reports of the Kamikazes’ amazing success caught the fancy of military leaders as well as the public—and the craze was on. The fact that sunken U. S. escort carriers were reported as standard fleet carriers was completely unknown and unrecognized in the surge of enthusiasm which overrode all defects of the Kamikaze attacks.

             Another factor contributing to the situation was the vanity of heroism.

             Thus came the age of suicide air attacks. Read the rest of this entry »

This article was published in the December 1927 issue of Proceedings magazine as “A New Job for the Supply Corps” by Lieutenant T. E. Hipp, (SC), U.S. Navy.

The Naval aircraft factory at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, was organized during the stress of the World War when naval officers were not available to recruit the organization and the work of airplane manufacture was a new departure for the Navy. The engineers and executives for the factory were procured almost entirely from civil life and the organization was so drawn as best to handle the factory’s peculiar mission. Naval precedent and tradition had little place in the structure of the organization and the selection of personnel. The present structure of the organization, although in some particulars similar to that of the standard Navy industrial organization, presents certain salient and unusual features which may be of interest to students of naval industrial management. The following organization chart shows the Naval aircraft factory lines of authority and the relations existing among the different offices and sub-divisions of the main departments. Special attention is invited to the position of inside superintendent, to which a member of the supply corps was assigned May 15, 1923.

The two outstanding features of this organization are the centralization of engineering responsibility and the close interlocking of the functions of procurement, production and accounting. It is this second feature, of particular interest to supply officers and production superintendents, that this article will describe. The cooperation of the supply department is essential to economical and expeditious production. Although, on account of desirable central control, available space and favorable location, the supply department of the naval aircraft factory functions as a general storehouse for aeronautical supplies for the entire naval service, its prime and vital duty in the production system is the procurement and storage of raw materials and shipment of completed aeronautical equipment.

To perform such duties it is necessary to maintain an organization capable of secur­ing the most satisfactory material required in the manufacturing processes, equipment and general supplies; to secure the most de­sirable delivery of material, keeping com­plete and accurate record of all unfilled pur­chase orders. Navy Regulations and orders provide for the manner of purchase, terms of payment and the recording and classify­ing of material after receipt. There are slight changes and modifications in the usual methods of storekeeping and record­ing at the naval aircraft factory in order to meet the needs of this particular in­dustry.

All production work, however authorized, is originated in the supply department by the means of a “Supply Officer’s Request,” which briefly outlines that which is to be done, and either makes references to, or encloses, specifications therefor, furnished by the engineering department. This work is assigned a specific priority in relation to other work in the plant, and in cases where it is necessary to make use of material or tools other than those which have been es­tablished as standard stock, the supply de­partment is required to become a part of the production schedule by furnishing esti­mated date of receipt of such items with subsequent revision’s when the necessity arises. To do this it is necessary for the supply department to maintain a definite follow-up on all material expected from sources outside of the factory. Therefore, in being charged with the duties of initiating all requests for production, the provision of specified material on scheduled dates, and the ultimate shipment of the completed prod­uct, the supply department does perform a function which is essential to and closely interlocked with production.

Another department which is closely allied with and essential to the production organization is the accounting office. In the civilian industrial field, the manufacturer is dependent upon records of past perform­ances and accurate cost records to enable him intelligently to operate his establishment to meet the keen competition encountered in making bids and estimates, and in providing a safe return and profit on the capital invested. Similarly in naval industrial organizations, and especially at the present time, due to the limited money allowances granted the bureaus to maintain and operate the fleet, it is necessary that intelligent cost data be furnished for the purpose of making estimates which will be useful in acquainting the department with the amounts that have been and will be obligated.

Taking into consideration this close interlocking of procurement, production and accounting, it was decided to request the assignment of an officer of the supply corps to the position of inside superintendent in the works department of the naval aircraft factory. The inside superintendent is the coordinator of the planning office, the schedule office, and the preparation division. His three principal assistants are the planning superintendent, the schedule superintendent, and the preparation superintendent.

The planning superintendent, under the general supervision of the inside superintendent, is in charge of the making of all estimates of the cost of work, the issuance of job orders for work, however authorized, with the responsibility for charging work to the proper appropriation title and account, and the checking of the authenticity of the authority. He is charged with the issuance of manufacturing orders or detailed work orders to shops for their portions of the work covered by the job order as a whole; and for the supply of plans, or other working data, to shops for work manufacturing orders. He is responsible for the drawing up or checking of bills of material, and the transmission of them to the Preparation Division.

The preparation superintendent, under the general supervision of the inside superintendent, is responsible for the stubbing from store of all material for authorized work; for the submission of purchase requests to the supply officer for material not in stores, which is required for authorized work; for the maintenance of shortage lists of material for authorized work; for the operation of sub-storerooms, or material depots for raw material or work in progress, in the custody of the works department, which is not being worked upon; for the operation of shop store rooms or material depots containing small amounts of material located within the shop areas, but which has not yet been stubbed from the supply officer’s books. He is responsible for the operation of the salvage section, handling rejected material; he is in charge of the
operation and maintenance of the factory transportation system, including operation of overhead cranes.

The schedule superintendent, under the general supervision of the inside superin­tendent, is responsible for the preparation and issuance of all works department sched­ules; for the maintenance of status reports on all work in progress; for the preparation of the weekly progress report, which is for­warded to the Bureau of Aeronautics; for the preparation of the monthly factory mas­ter schedule, which shows the general time-planning of work ahead of the factory, and for the maintenance of the work load on the various shops.

After analyzing these duties, it is appar­ent that the position of inside superintend­ent, which embraces these functions, is a central office, making intimate contact, not only with all of the shops, but also with the engineering department, the supply depart­ment and the accounting department. In requesting the assignment of an officer of the supply corps to this duty, it was believed that a supply officer, with his knowledge of accounting and material sup­ply, could as quickly acquaint himself with those phases of this position usually not within the scope of a supply officer, as a line officer, or naval constructor, who is more familiar with the manufacturing problem; could acquaint himself with those phrases related to supply and accounting, and furthermore, the experience to be gained in such a position should prove of great value professionally, in the future.

Due to the rapid growth and recognized necessity of aviation throughout the naval service, it is desirable that officers of the supply corps become familiar with the needs and requirements of this important branch of the nation’s first line of defense, and it is believed that the naval aircraft factory, for the time being at least, is the best aviation school for supply officers in existence.

Having in mind a more far-reaching ef­fect and influence, it is believed, that, not only will the duties described be of great benefit to an officer who might at some time or other be concerned with aviation account­ing and supply, but surely a certain period of service within the organization of any industrial department will better fit him for the position of supply officer of a yard or vessel. Through such service, he has been able to observe the problems encount­ered; the cause and effect of the different policies, systems and requirements, all tending to make of him an abler executive with a larger and more cooperative spirit.

Why not then, assign junior officers in the supply corps to duty in industrial or­ganizations for training and experience? Even further, carrying this idea to its logical conclusion, there is no apparent reason why a supply officer, with such experience and training, should not be eminently capable of assuming the responsibilities of directing any Navy industrial establishment. It is to the best interest of each corps to take ad­vantage of any opportunity afforded to enlarge its field of activities, and especially, if by so doing, it arrives at a broader view­point, which tends to promote a greater spirit of harmony and efficiency in the or­ganization of the Navy as a whole.

This article, written by Naval Constructor C. W. Fisher, U. S. Navy was published in the February 1917 issue of Proceedings magazine, entitled “The Log of the Constitution, Feb. 21-24, 1815: The Capture of the Cyane and the Levant“ .

 

The Capture of the Cyane and Levant by U.S. frigate Constitution

Enclosed herewith is a blueprint of an extract from the log of the U. S. frigate Constitution, dated February 21 to February 24, 1815. This brief extract includes a description of the action between the Constitution and British vessels Cyane and Levant. As an example of most admirable seamanship, excellent control, fine tactics, and a happy as well as forceful style of recording important events, I consider this brief extract to be of sufficient value to warrant its being published for the “information and guidance” of the navy to-day. It would be hard to find a better model than this modest record of a most unusual and courageous action.

Remarks &c. on board U. S. frigate Constitution, Charles Stewart Esq., Commander on a Cruise, Tuesday February 21, 1815

Remarks &c. continued, Tuesday February 21, 1815

Remarks &c. on board U. S. frigate Constitution, Charles Stewart Esq. Commander on a Cruise, Wednesday February 22, 1815

Remarks &c. on board U. S. frigate Constitution, Charles Stewart Esq., Commander on a Cruise, Thursday February 23, 1815

Remarks &c. on board U. S. frigate Constitution, Charles Stewart Esq. Commander on a Cruise, Friday, February 24, 1815

A Marine Sea Stallion helicopter with a magnetic orange pipe in tow sweeps the Bay in Hon Gay, North Vietnam during Operation End Sweep.

This article was originally published in the March 1974 issue of Proceedings magazine by Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, U. S. Navy

Western strategists of every stripe had grown hoarse calling for the mining of Haiphong Harbor and, at last, it was done. Now, with the ceasefire signed, the mines had to be retrieved or destroyed and, as surface ships of Task Force 58 trailed a sweeping heli­copter into Haiphong on 17 June 1973, the end of “End Sweep”—a tedious, lengthy, and totally unglamorous job—was in sight. Read the rest of this entry »